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There is a stable relationship between the Openness/Intellect domain of personality and
aesthetic engagement. However, neither of these are simple constructs and while the
relationship exists, process based evidence explaining the relationship is still lacking.
This research sought to clarify the relationship by evaluating the influence of the
Openness and Intellect aspects on several different aesthetic emotions. Two studies
looked at the between- and within-person differences in arousal and the emotions of
interest, pleasure and confusion in response to visual art. The results suggest that
Openness, as opposed to Intellect, was predictive of greater arousal, interest and
pleasure, while both aspects explained less confusion. Differences in Openness were
associated with within-person emotion appraisal contingencies, particularly greater
novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure relationships. Those higher in Openness were
particularly influenced by novelty in artworks. For pleasure this relationship suggested
a different qualitative structure of appraisals. The appraisal of novelty is part of the
experience of pleasure for those high in Openness, but not those low in Openness. This
research supports the utility of studying Openness and Intellect as separate aspects of
the broad domain and clarifies the relationship between Openness and aesthetic states
in terms of within-person appraisal processes.
Keywords: Openness/Intellect, interest, knowledge emotions, aesthetics, personality processes, appraisals,
multi-level modeling
INTRODUCTION
“It is art that makes life, makes interest, makes importance... and I know of no substitute whatever for
the force and beauty of its process.”
-Henry James
Making and appreciating art is a quintessentially human behavior, but not everyone would agree
with the sentiment expressed by Henry James above. Divergent opinions about the importance
of art and experiences with art make the study of individual diﬀerences a crucial part of
aesthetic science—after all, it is said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. However, in
psychological aesthetics there are still gaps in what is known about both the beauty and the
beholder. Psychological aesthetics has primarily focused on one aspect of the aesthetic experience
in the form of liking, pleasure and preference. Aesthetics associations with personality—primarily
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Openness/Intellect—have focused almost exclusively on
individual diﬀerences in liking diﬀerent types of art. Further,
little work has gone into understanding the processes underlying
the relationship between aesthetics and Openness/Intellect.
This is problematic because the nature of the personality/art
appreciation relationship could seem circular, given that
personality items directly mention aesthetic engagement when
measuring Openness/Intellect.
In the current study, we extend previous research investigating
the relationship between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic
appreciation in three ways. First, we model the appraisal
processes underlying the emotions of interest, pleasure, and
confusion. This extends previous research by considering
three distinct emotions rather than pleasure only. Second,
we test whether the aspects of Openness and Intellect
diﬀerentially predict these three emotional states. This extends
previous research by considering the two diﬀerent aspects of
Openness/Intellect, rather than the broad domain only. Third, we
test whether the aspects of Openness and Intellect diﬀerentially
predict within-person appraisal processes underlying these
three emotional states. This extends previous research by
considering within-person processes, rather than between-
person associations only. By integrating these various elements
we intended to answer the question: Why are those higher in
Openness/Intellect more aesthetically engaged?
Aesthetic People
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain of the aesthetically
sensitive, according to many areas of research. It is the best
predictor of positive aesthetic attitudes and participation in
aesthetic activities such as visiting museums, reading literature,
and creating art (McManus and Furnham, 2006). Previous
ﬁndings have demonstrated Openness/Intellect to be the best
personality predictor of artistic creativity (Feist, 1998; Silvia
et al., 2009b) and vocational interests related to the arts (Barrick
et al., 2003). Most importantly, Openness/Intellect is a consistent
predictor of aesthetic appreciation, which has been shown to
be highly variable (Vessel and Rubin, 2010). Several studies
indicate that Openness/Intellect is associated with liking a broad
range of artistic types including abstract, representational, pop,
renaissance, cubism, Japanese, and unpleasant art (Furnham and
Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009,
2010). Openness/Intellect therefore is a domain of personality
that explains individual diﬀerences in creating, seeking, and
appreciating art.
Openness/Intellect is an unusually heterogeneous personality
domain, and recent work suggests that it can be represented
with two major aspects: Openness and Intellect (DeYoung et al.,
2007, 2012;Woo et al., 2014). Johnson (1994) poetically described
Openness as interest in beauty and Intellect as interest in truth,
suggesting that they are both information-seeking traits diverging
in the types of situations that elicit interest.
Intellect is associated with ﬂuid and crystallized intelligence
and with scientiﬁc creativity, while Openness is associated
with artistic creativity, implicit learning ability, and crystallized
intelligence (Kaufman et al., 2010; Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011;
Kaufman, 2013). DeYoung (2014) distinguishes the aspects
on the basis of diﬀerent styles of cognitive exploration, with
Openness reﬂecting individual diﬀerences in exploration through
perceptual or sensory information, and Intellect reﬂecting
individual diﬀerences in learning and exploration of abstract
information. Johnson’s (1994) and DeYoung’s (2014) distinctions
suggest that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect
primarily associated with appreciation of visual art. Further
distinctions based on emotional experiences have also emerged.
Silvia and Nusbaum (2011) showed that Openness, and not
Intellect, is associated with unusual aesthetic experiences such
as chills, feeling touched, and absorption, suggesting diﬀerences
between the aspects in the propensity to experience states that
have been linked to broad deﬁnitions of aesthetic experiences.
Given the distinction between Openness and Intellect we aimed
to test their diﬀerential roles in aesthetic experiences.
Aesthetic Emotions
Nearly all research on the link between personality and
aesthetic appreciation, like aesthetics research more generally,
has focused on how much participants liked or disliked an
artwork (e.g., Furnham and Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003;
Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009). Since the pioneering work of
Berlyne (1971), most models of aesthetics concern themselves
with states of pleasure, liking, or preference. Silvia (2009)
argued that, while important, such evaluations do not take
into account the breadth of emotions felt in response to art.
A similar trend exists within the research in the emerging ﬁeld
of neuroaesthetics, which has almost exclusively focused on the
evaluation of something as pleasing or beautiful (Fayn and Silvia,
2015). Such a reductionist approach runs the risk of missing
meaningful individual diﬀerences in aesthetic experiences and in
understanding the ways in which personality traits manifest in
such experiences. Emotions felt in response to aesthetic objects—
categorized within this paper as aesthetic emotions—are varied
and include interest, confusion, pleasure, anger, and even disgust
(Silvia, 2012). The term aesthetic emotions is not used to suggest
a separate group of emotions only felt in response to aesthetic
objects. Rather, it is used to group the states that have been
observed to occur in response to aesthetic objects.
The distinction between liking versus disliking something
may be a valid indicator of pleasure, but it does not represent
the depth and complexity of aesthetic emotions. A group of
emotions frequently felt in response to art, yet distinct from
pleasure, are the knowledge emotions. The knowledge emotions—
interest, awe, beauty, confusion, and surprise—associated with
beliefs about thoughts and knowledge, they stem from epistemic
goals, and arise frommetacognitive processes (Silvia, 2010, 2012).
Several emotional states may ﬁt this categorization, and all
are distinct from pleasure. The emotion of interest has been
distinguished from pleasure on the basis of cognitive appraisal
processes—interest is positively associated with complex stimuli,
but pleasure is negatively related to complexity (Turner and
Silvia, 2006). Two other states that are distinct from pleasure
and involve epistemic goals are awe and beauty. The emotion
of awe is felt as one tries to accommodate vast novelty, the
success of which leads to a powerful emotional state (Shiota
et al., 2007). Awe can be and is frequently experienced as a
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1877
Fayn et al. Aesthetic People
negative and fear-like state when accommodation is unsuccessful.
Beauty is deﬁned as “the exhilarating feeling that something
complex, perhaps to the point of being profound, might yield an
understanding” (Armstrong and Detweiler-Bedell, 2008, p. 312).
Beauty is distinguished from the pleasant on the basis of eﬀort:
pleasure is associated with ﬂuent processing (Reber, 2012), but
beauty relies on eﬀortful processing that drives arousal and
results in an exhilarating experience. Therefore, several aesthetic
states are distinguished from simple pleasure. All are elicited by
complex and novel situations where understanding is required
but is eﬀortful. Pleasure, on the other hand, is facilitated by ease
of understanding.
From the individual diﬀerences perspective, two studies have
distinguished pleasure and other aesthetic experiences through
factor analysis techniques. Eysenck (1941) attempted to explain
the presence of two factors in aesthetic preference. The ﬁrst
factor was easily attributable to valance, while the second was
generally associated with preferences for the abstract. A core
feature of abstract art is novelty and complexity, suggesting
interest driven rather than pleasure driven preferences. More
recently, Markovic´ (2010) found that two factors describe
aesthetic appreciation. These factors were labeled aﬀective tone
and aesthetic experiences. Descriptors “lovely” and “charming”
loaded highest on aﬀective tone, while aesthetic experience was
associated with adjectives such as “exceptional” and “profound.”
Thus, converging evidence and theory suggest that some aesthetic
experiences are distinct from mild positive states of pleasure
and that at the core of these states is the resolution of novelty
and complexity, rather than ﬂuent processing associated with
pleasure.
Aesthetic states, like other emotions, are generated by
appraisal process patterns (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). Interest
occurs when a stimulus is appraised as novel yet understandable
(Silvia, 2005). Novelty orientates and highjacks our attention,
while the resolution of the novelty toward understanding leads
to the positive experience of interest. This appraisal structure
has been supported in response to art, poetry, and ﬁlm (Silvia,
2005, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a; Silvia and Berg, 2011). Pleasure
and confusion are also predicted by the same appraisals but
in diﬀerent ways. Confusion is associated with appraisals of
novelty and lack of understanding (Silvia, 2010). Pleasure is
elicited by appraised understanding and negatively related to
novelty (Turner and Silvia, 2006). The appraisal approach is
therefore particularly useful in distinguishing diﬀering aesthetic
emotions and studying the underlying processes that facilitate
them.
Between Aesthetic Emotions and
Aesthetic People
Appraisal theories of emotions have been used to further
understanding of processes that underlie personality traits
associated with emotional experiences. There are two ways in
which personality is involved in the appraisal-emotion system:
(1) appraisal strength—the tendency to appraise situations in
a particular way—varies as a function of personality; and (2)
appraisal-emotion relationships vary as a function of personality
(Kuppens, 2009; Kuppens and Tong, 2010).
Openness/Intellect has been implicated in both of the
aforementioned ways. Curiosity—a trait associated with
Openness/Intellect (Mussel, 2010)—is associated with greater
appraised understanding, which fully mediates the curiosity-
interest relationship (Silvia, 2008). That is, curious people feel
greater interest because they are better able to understand
epistemic situations, which in turn predicts greater interest. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the theoretical framework proposed
by Mussel (2013) for Intellect traits. Within this framework,
Intellect traits are associated with processes of seeking and
conquering intellectually stimulating events, which map onto
interest and understanding.
Further, within the experience of interest, novelty and
understanding have been found to form two clusters with
Openness/Intellect predicting membership in only one (Silvia
et al., 2009a). Openness/Intellect was associated with the cluster
in which novelty was a much stronger predictor of interest
while understanding was less important, compared to the other
cluster. This suggests that Openness/Intellect may moderate
the interest-appraisal relationships predisposing those higher
on Openness/Intellect to be more sensitive to novelty and less
sensitive to understanding appraisals. One study has looked at
the unique inﬂuence of the Openness and Intellect aspects on
the processes and appraisal structure of interest in response to
quotations. Openness was related to greater interest overall and
a lessened reliance on understanding, while Intellect related to
greater understanding (Fayn et al., 2015). This suggests that
Openness and Intellect may relate to interest in diﬀerent ways
and that appraisal processes are useful for explaining these
diﬀerences.
The inﬂuence of Openness/Intellect on the appraisal structure
of pleasure and confusion, and the distinct inﬂuence of Openness
and Intellect on the appraisal structure of interest, have not
previously been tested. Taken together, previous ﬁndings indicate
that appraisals can explain the mechanisms that underlie
Openness/Intellect and its relationship with interest. Therefore,
we aimed to evaluate the underlying processes associated with the
Openness and Intellect aspects in order to understand whether
those higher in either aspect are more aesthetically engaged and
how the aspects manifest diﬀerently in aesthetic experiences.
The Present Research
In summary, positive aesthetic experience is broader than liking
and may be divided into two families of experiences: pleasure
and the knowledge emotions. Openness/Intellect may inﬂuence
both these states and the processes that underlie these traits.
Therefore, we moved away from the predominant practice
of evaluating liking artworks, in lieu of measuring distinct
emotional states that have previously been implicated in the
aesthetic experience. Additionally, by studying variability in
appraisal-emotion relationships across multiple stimuli we were
able to evaluate the way personality manifests in aesthetic
experiences. Thus, the aims of the current research are
to explore the relationship between Openness/Intellect and
aesthetic appreciation by: (1) extending the states studied within
personality-aesthetics relationships to pleasure, interest, and
confusion; (2) evaluating the unique inﬂuences of the Openness
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and Intellect aspects; and (3) testing whether the Openness and
Intellect aspects moderate the within-person appraisal processes
that underlie these aesthetic emotional states.
Study 1 evaluated the diﬀerential inﬂuence of Openness and
Intellect on diﬀerent aesthetic states in response to visual art. In
Study 2 we tested whether the appraisal processes associated with
interest, pleasure and confusion can explain the relationships
between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation, and
whether the Openness and Intellect inﬂuence appraisal processes.
STUDY 1
The purpose of this study was to test whether Openness and
Intellect diﬀerentially predict states of interest, pleasure, and
arousal. Based on past work on Openness and Intellect, we
predicted that Openness would be a stronger predictor of
aesthetic experience than Intellect.
Method
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the
University of Sydney. Written consent was obtained from all the
participants before the experiment according to the established
guidelines of the committee.
Participants
A total of 53 psychology students (74% female) participated in
the study for course credit. Participants were aged between 17 and
42 years (M = 19.15 years, SD= 3.01 years). All participants were
proﬁcient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions.
Procedure
The study was conducted on computers over two 1-h sessions
to minimize the inﬂuence of a long session of psychometric
assessments on aesthetic appreciation. In the ﬁrst session
participants completed the Openness and Intellect scales, as
well as other individual diﬀerence measures not relevant to the
current study. In the second session—at least 1 h apart from
the ﬁrst—participants reported their thoughts and feelings in
response to seven color images taken from published art books.
The images were all in color and could broadly be described as
modern art, comprising of both abstract and representational
examples. The artists were: Dorosheva, Kadel, Kiefer, Magritte,
Moki, Pollock, and Ryden.
Measures
Openness and Intellect
Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big Five Aspect
Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). Each scale included 10 Likert
style items on a ﬁve-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree,
5 = strongly agree) such as “I enjoy the beauty of nature”
(Openness) and “I like to solve complex problems” (Intellect).
The Openness scale is made up of items that reﬂect the Openness
to Aesthetics, Feelings and Fantasy scales, while Intellect items
include self-reported ability and Openness to Ideas items. The
scale yields a full-scale Openness/Intellect score along with scores
for the Openness and Intellect aspects. The internal consistencies
for Openness (α= 0.86) and Intellect (α= 0.79) were good within
the current sample.
Ratings of interest, pleasure, and arousal
After viewing each picture, people rated it on a series of seven-
point semantic diﬀerential scales. The scales assessed feelings of
interest (interesting-uninteresting, engaging-boring), pleasure
(pleasing-displeasing, enjoyable-unenjoyable), and arousal
(calm-aroused, sluggish-excited). Most of the items have been
used in past research in research on emotions (e.g., Day, 1967,
1968; Silvia, 2005; Turner and Silvia, 2006). The items were
reverse-scored and averaged; high scores indicate high levels of
interest, pleasure, and arousal.
Results and Discussion
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2 (Muthén and
Muthén, 1998–2012) using maximum likelihood with robust
standard errors. For interpreting eﬀect sizes, we use the
common guidelines (Cumming, 2012) of r = 0.10/0.30/0.50
as small/medium/large. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics
and correlations for the measures of personality and aesthetic
experience.
The zero-order correlations suggest, as expected, that
Openness was associated with stronger aesthetic engagement
than Intellect: Openness had stronger relationships, medium
in size, with all three outcomes. To examine their diﬀerences
more formally, we conducted a multivariate regression model
in which Openness and Intellect were the two predictors and
interest, pleasure, and arousal were the outcomes. Figure 1
displays the model and results. The eﬀects of Openness on
interest, pleasure, and arousal were medium in size, and most
were statistically signiﬁcant; the eﬀects of Intellect on interest,
pleasure, and arousal, in contrast, were all near-zero or small in
size. The results lend support to the utility of separating Openness
and Intellect when evaluating individual diﬀerences in aesthetic
states. Openness had notable relationships with the three types of
aesthetic experience, whereas Intellect did not. Limitations of this
study are the small sample size which we addressed in study 2, and
a limited range on the Openness scale. Both of these limitations
have a bearing on the strength of the results found in this study.
Small sample sizes are an indication of underpowered studies,
while range restrictions usually underestimate eﬀect sizes.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of personality
variables with between-person aggregated ratings.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Intellect 35.08 6.43 1 0.27 0.13 0.18 0.10
(2) Openness 40.23 5.39 1 0.28 0.34 0.39
(3) Interest 5.83 0.67 1 0.84 0.50
(4) Pleasure 5.52 0.74 1 0.47
(5) Arousal 4.67 0.72 1
n = 53. All relationships above 0.18 are significant at 0.05 level, all those above
0.38 are significant at the 0.01 level, and all those above 0.49 are significant at the
0.001 level.
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FIGURE 1 | Effects of Openness and Intellect on ratings of interest,
pleasure, and arousal: Study 1. n = 53. Note that the effect of Intellect on
Arousal is β < 0.01 and hence not drawn. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. ∗p < 0.05.
STUDY 2
Study 2 sought to extend these ﬁndings in several important ways.
First, we shifted the range of emotional states that we assessed
by focusing on interest, pleasure, and confusion. Whereas interest
and pleasure have a long history in aesthetics research, confusion
has only recently attracted attention among emotion researchers
as a response to events that are unfamiliar and hard to understand
(Silvia, 2010).
Second, to understand the processes underlying the
Openness/Intellect-emotion relationships, appraisal processes
were evaluated. The inclusion of appraisal processes can
help determine why those higher in Openness/Intellect are
more aesthetically sensitive—whether they are more or less
emotionally responsive to appraisals. That is, we seek to
determine whether Openness/Intellect can explain individual
diﬀerences in appraisal-emotion relationships. As previously
mentioned, Openness/Intellect moderates the appraisal structure
of interest and relates to greater appraisals of understanding
(Silvia, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The current study extends
this ﬁnding in several ways. First, we examine the two aspects
of Openness/Intellect for their unique inﬂuence on aesthetic
experience. Second, we test whether Openness and Intellect
similarly moderate the appraisal structure of pleasure and
confusion. We expect, as in Study 1, that Openness but not
Intellect will be the aesthetically relevant aspect. Third, we
included an additional individual diﬀerence measure to help
clarify the roles of Openness and Intellect. A possible explanation
for the relationship between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic
appreciation is that those higher in Openness/Intellect have
greater knowledge of the arts (Silvia, 2007a), which in turn
predicts interest in art (Silvia, 2006). Art expertise has been
shown to moderate the interest-appraisal relationships—experts
are less reliant on understanding and more sensitive to novelty
(Silvia, 2013)—a ﬁnding also associated with Openness/Intellect
(Silvia et al., 2009a). This may indicate that the eﬀects of
Openness/Intellect on aesthetic appreciation are a function of
expertise in the arts rather than a diﬀerences in personality.
These variables have not been studied together in the context of
aesthetic appreciation, therefore, we controlled for art expertise
in the current study.
Method
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committees of
the University of Sydney and the University of North Carolina
at Greensboro. Written consent was obtained from all the
participants before the experiment according to the established
guidelines of the committees.
Participants
A total of 225 students from various degrees and majors
(69% female) participated in the study for either course credit
or $10 USD compensation. The students majors were 25.3%
Physical Sciences, 21.8% Arts, 14.7% Psychology, 12% Health
Sciences, 10% Business/Economics, 6.7% Social Sciences, 4.4%
were undecided, and 4.9% had majors that did not ﬁt into
the categories presented as they were mixtures of more than
one category. Participants’ age was between 18 and 56 years
(M = 20.56 years, SD = 4.91 years). All participants were
proﬁcient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions.
Procedure
The data were collected during a 1-h session in groups ranging
from 1 to 8 participants at a time. The study involved completion
of self-report personality scales and ratings of 18 visual art images.
We sought to include a broad scope of pieces ranging from
traditional to contemporary art. The images were all in color and
included both abstract and representational works. The artists
were: Bacon, Blake, Goya, Hayuk, Kato, Kiefer, Magritte, Marc,
Monroe, Pollock, Repin, Ryden, Schiele, Siqueiros, and Turner.
The self-report scales came before and after the visual art ratings
to avoid fatigue. All data was collected using Medialab (Jarvis,
2004) on computers. Images were presented in a random order,
as were questions relating to the images; both controlled by the
randomization algorithm within Medialab.
Measures
Openness and Intellect
As in Study 1, Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big
Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). Each scale has 10 items
on a ﬁve-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree).
Art expertise
Art expertise was measured using the aesthetic ﬂuency scale
(Smith and Smith, 2006), which assesses expertise by asking
people how familiar they are with diﬀerent ﬁgures and ideas from
art history. The scale got participants to report their familiarity
in response to 10 people and concepts (Mary Cassatt, Isamu
Noguchi, John Singer Sargent, Alessandro Boticelli, Gian Lorenzo
Bernini, Fauvism, Egyptian Funerary Stelae, Impressionism,
Chinese Scrolls, Abstract Expressionism). The scale ranged from
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0 (I have never heard of this artist or term) to 4 (I can talk
intelligently about this artist or idea in art). It should be noted that
the ﬂuency scale assesses self-reported expertise in the arts and
may be subject to overclaiming. However, the aesthetic ﬂuency
scale has been used widely used to assess expertise and has
displayed good internal and external validity (e.g., Silvia, 2007a;
Silvia and Barona, 2009; DeWall et al., 2011; Silvia and Nusbaum,
2011; Smith, 2014).
Emotions and cognitions in response to visual art
Participants viewed 18 images of various valance and style taken
from various art books, previous studies, and the google images
database. Participants could observe the image for as long as they
wanted, but for a minimum of 5 s. A smaller version of the image
was also visible while reporting on their thoughts and feelings.
For each image participants completed items assessing various
emotions and cognitions. For emotional evaluations participants
were asked: “Did you ﬁnd this picture. . .” followed by items
for interesting, pleasing, and confusing. Appraisal processes of
novelty (complex-simple, unusual-common) and understanding
(hard to understand-easy to understand, comprehensible-
incomprehensible) were assessed using seven-point semantic
diﬀerential scales. All scales had been previously used in
assessments of aesthetic states (Silvia, 2005, 2010, 2013). In
addition to the emotion items, we asked some behavior-like
preference items, which are common in aesthetics research (e.g.,
Cooper and Silvia, 2009). For each image, participants were
asked I would like more information on this image, On Facebook
I would “like” this image, On Facebook I would share this image
on my wall, and I would like to own a copy of this. Each item was
answered with a binary NO/YES scale. The time taken to view
each image was also recorded to evaluate whether Openness or
Intellect were associated with longer viewing times.
Results and Discussion
Data Reduction and Analysis
The items for the personality and aesthetic ﬂuency scales were
averaged to form overall scores. Internal consistencies for the
BFAS Openness and Intellect scales, and the aesthetic ﬂuency
scale were good (see Table 2).
The large number of images viewed by each person allowed
us to use multilevel models, which can estimate between-person
eﬀects, within-person eﬀects, and their interactions (Silvia,
2007b; Nezlek, 2011). For the multilevel models, between-person
predictors (Openness, Intellect, and Aesthetic Fluency) were
centered at the sample’s grand mean and were rescaled by
dividing the full scale score by the number of items in the
scale.Within-person predictors (appraisals of novelty-complexity
and understanding) were centered at each person’s own mean
(Enders and Toﬁghi, 2007). The null model was used to evaluate
intraclass correlation coeﬃcients (ICCs). The ICCs indicated a
signiﬁcant amount of variance for interest (19%), pleasure (11%),
and confusion (13%) at the between-person level.
The random slope and intercept models were tested separately
for each emotion and are graphically depicted in Figure 2.
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2, using maximum
likelihood with robust standard errors. All coeﬃcients are
unstandardized regression weights; some, where noted, are
logistic eﬀects. Estimation of power is a contentious topic within
multilevel modeling due to the complexity of the parameters
being estimated (Nezlek, 2011); by most standards the number
of level 1 and level 2 units of measurement in our sample is
suﬃcient to assume accurate estimations of the parameters of
interest (Maas and Hox, 2005).
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Relationships
Openness and Intellect were both related to greater Aesthetic
Fluency, pleasure, and lower confusion. Openness, but not
Intellect, was related to greater interest (Table 2). The states of
interest and pleasure had a strong overlap at the between and
within person levels, and were unrelated to confusion at the
between person level. Pleasure and interest diﬀered from each
other in their within-person relationship with confusion, interest
was independent of confusion, but pleasure had a small negative
relationship with confusion.
Overall Between-person Effects of Openness and
Intellect on Emotions and Preference Ratings
Our ﬁrst models examined the overall eﬀects of Openness and
Intellect on emotion ratings (interest, pleasure, and confusion)
and on preference ratings (e.g., whether people indicated wanting
to own a copy of the image). As expected, Openness and Intellect
showed diverging relationships with these outcomes. Openness
predicted ﬁnding the images signiﬁcantly more interesting
(b = 0.61, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001), more pleasing (b = 0.77,
SE = 0.09, p < 0.001), and less confusing (b = −0.31, SE = 0.10,
p = 0.003). Intellect, in contrast, predicted ﬁnding the images
less confusing (b = −0.29, SE = 0.11, p = 0.008), but it didn’t
signiﬁcantly predict either interest (b = −0.06, SE = 0.10,
p = 0.573) or pleasure (b = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = 0.287).
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and correlations between personality traits, aesthetic fluency and emotions.
N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Openness 225 39.16 5.59 (0.76) 0.39 0.53 0.39 0.56 −0.28
(2) Intellect 225 36.23 5.51 (0.80) 0.39 0.11 0.27 −0.28
(3) Aesthetic Fluency 224 22.21 7.41 (0.83) 0.36 0.52 −0.26
(4) Interest 224 5.21 0.84 1 0.67 0.06
(5) Pleasure 224 3.51 0.83 0.52 1 −0.13
(6) Confusion 224 3.98 0.80 0.02 −0.20 1
All relationships above 0.13 are significant at 0.001 level, and all those below 0.13 are not significant; correlation below the diagonal are within-person relationships;
Cronbach’s alphas in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | A depiction of the multilevel models.
For the preference ratings, a logistic model found that
Openness signiﬁcantly predicted the likelihood of wanting more
information about the image (b= 1.65, SE = 0.32, p< 0.001), the
likelihood of liking (b = 0.93, SE = 0.16, p < 0.001) and sharing
(b = 1.09, SE = 0.25, p< 0.001) the image on Facebook, and the
likelihood of wanting to own it (b = 1.14, SE = 0.18, p < 0.001).
Intellect, in contrast, did not signiﬁcantly predict wanting to learn
more (b = −0.49, SE = 0.30, p = 0.101), liking (b = −0.08,
SE = 0.16, p = 0.619) or sharing (b = 0.14, SE = 0.18, p = 0.402)
the image on Facebook, or wanting to own it (b= 0.02, SE= 0.22,
p = 0.942).
For view times—averaged across all stimuli—a regression
model found that Openness signiﬁcantly predicted greater
viewing times (b = 206.29, SE = 62.85, p = 0.001). Intellect did
not predict variance in view times (b = −0.39.06, SE = 63.89,
p = 0.542).
In short, Openness and Intellect diverged in their relationships
with aesthetic experience, preference ratings, and viewing times.
Openness signiﬁcantly predicted all of them, but Intellect
predicted only feeling less confused.
Overall Within-person Effects of Appraisals on
Emotions
The results for all multilevel models are presented in Table 3.
These models evaluated the within-person main eﬀects
of appraisals on emotions. As in past work, interest was
signiﬁcantly predicted by appraisals of high novelty and high
comprehensibility, and confusion was predicted by high novelty
and low comprehensibility. Pleasure, in contrast, was more
weakly predicted by novelty but predicted by comprehensibility,
consistent with models that emphasize ease of understanding
(Reber, 2012) and achieving insight and knowledge (Leder et al.,
2012) as a source of liking.
Personality as Predictors of Emotion Intercepts and
Moderators of Appraisal-emotion Relationships
Openness and Intellect had diﬀerent main eﬀects on aesthetic
experience, but do they moderate how appraisals inﬂuence
aesthetic experience? These models included Openness and
Intellect as between-person predictors of emotions and appraisal-
emotion slopes. If a between-person trait signiﬁcantly predicts a
slope, then the relationship between an appraisal and an emotion
shifts across levels of the trait. Prediction of intercepts implies
that the overall mean of the emotion shifts according to trait
regardless of appraisals. Both intercepts and slopes were modeled
as random in these models.
Openness predicted larger intercepts for interest, pleasure,
and smaller intercepts for confusion. Intellect predicted lower
intercepts for confusion, but was not signiﬁcantly related to
interest and pleasure intercepts.
For interest (Model 1), the eﬀect of novelty was moderated
by both Openness and Intellect. For people high in Openness
and Intellect, novelty was more strongly coupled to interest.
No signiﬁcant moderation eﬀects appeared for understanding.
For pleasure (Model 2), the eﬀect of novelty was moderated by
Openness but not Intellect. For people high in Openness, novelty
was more strongly linked to pleasure. Follow up analysis on
the diﬀerence between the novelty-pleasure slopes for Openness
and Intellect indicated that they were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other (Wald test = 1.00, df = 1, p = 0.32). No
signiﬁcant moderation eﬀects appeared for understanding. And
for confusion (Model 3), in contrast, neither Openness nor
Intellect moderated either appraisal. Neither the eﬀect of novelty
nor the eﬀect of understanding on confusion varied across levels
of Openness and Intellect.
Considered together, these results suggest that both Openness
and Intellect are associated with greater sensitivity to novelty
in the experience of interest, but only the Openness aspect is
associated with greater sensitivity to novelty in the experience
of pleasure. While the slope moderations by Openness and
Intellect were not found to diﬀer from each other, the moderating
inﬂuence of Openness was signiﬁcant, while the inﬂuence of
Intellect was not. Finally, Openness, but not Intellect, was
associated with greater pleasure and interest overall.
Exploring Art Expertise
Our ﬁnal models explored the roles of art expertise (measured
with the aesthetic ﬂuency scale). To examine art expertise, we
included it alongside Openness and Intellect to see if it reduced
their eﬀects. As we discussed earlier, such a result would suggest
that the eﬀects of personality are largely carried by acquired
expertise about the arts.
The inclusion of art expertise didn’t change any of the
Openness and Intellect ﬁndings with respect to interest,
confusion and pleasure. This suggests that the eﬀects of Openness
and Intellect are not driven by greater expertise in the arts. For
interest (Model 4), neither the eﬀect of novelty nor the eﬀect of
understanding was moderated by art expertise, but expertise was
related to greater intercepts in the model. For pleasure (Model
5), neither the eﬀect of novelty nor the eﬀect of understanding
was moderated by art expertise, but expertise was related to
greater intercepts in the model. And for confusion (Model 6), art
expertise moderated the eﬀect of novelty, but not understanding;
in contrast, neither Openness nor Intellect moderated either
appraisal. This suggests that novelty is less related to confusion
for those with greater art expertise. These results suggest that
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TABLE 3 | Multilevel models of within and between person predictors of aesthetic experiences.
Within-person predictors
Interest (DV) Pleasure (DV) Confusion (DV)
Novelty 0.39∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗ (0.03) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02)
Understanding 0.28∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.56∗∗∗ (0.03)
Between-person predictors
Slopes Slopes Slopes
Intercept N U Intercept N U Intercept N U
Models 1–3
Openness 0.61∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.12∗∗ (0.04) −0.06 (0.05) 0.77∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.16∗∗ (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) −0.31∗∗ (0.10) −0.01 (0.04) −0.03 (0.04)
Intellect −0.06 (0.10) 0.12∗ (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 0.09 (0.09) 0.07 (0.06) −0.04 (0.05) −0.29∗∗ (0.11) −0.06 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
Models 4–6
Openness 0.45∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.11∗ (0.05) −0.04 (0.05) 0.57∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.13∗ (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) −0.23∗ (0.15) 0.03 (0.04) <0.01 (0.05)
Intellect −0.09 (0.10) 0.11∗ (0.05) 0.07 (0.04) −0.01 (0.09) 0.05 (0.06) −0.03 (0.04) −0.27∗ (0.11) −0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
Aesthetic
fluency
0.28∗∗ (0.08) 0.02 (0.04) −0.05 (0.03) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) −0.03 (0.04) −0.13 (0.09) −0.06∗ (0.03) −0.06 (0.04)
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; N = Novelty-Interest slope; U = Understanding-Interest slope; Standard errors are reported in brackets.
the novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure moderation are not
inﬂuenced by art expertise but are rather driven by Openness.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain that best explains
individual diﬀerences in aesthetic appreciation. However, the
research linking actual art appreciation to the domain has
several issues. First, as discussed in the introduction the focus
on liking artworks is limited, as aesthetic experience is much
broader and richer than mild feelings of pleasure (Silvia, 2009).
Second, there’s a risk of circularity in the relationship, given
that items about aesthetic engagement appear on all major
Openness to Experience scales. Without examining why this
relationship exists, not much is added to our understanding
of Openness/Intellect and aesthetics. In this research, we
broadened the range of aesthetic emotions and examined
appraisal mechanisms that could explain diﬀerences in aesthetic
experience as a function of Openness/Intellect. Art expertise was
evaluated alongside personality to test whether the inﬂuence of
Openness and Intellect on aesthetic appreciation can be explained
by greater art knowledge.
As predicted, Openness/Intellect reﬂected individual
diﬀerences in aesthetic experiences—both pleasure and the
knowledge emotions. The strength of the relationship was
particularly driven by Openness as opposed to Intellect,
supporting the distinction in the aspects based on perceptual
versus abstract engagement (DeYoung, 2014). Mechanisms for
these relationships were also discovered through diﬀerences
in appraisal-emotion relationships. The Openness/Intellect
aspects predicted reactivity to novelty appraisals in experiences
of interest. While the novelty seeking core of Openness/Intellect
has previously been suggested (Woo et al., 2014), our study
provides within-person process evidence for this special
relationship with novelty and demonstrates that those
higher in Openness/Intellect are reactive to novelty in their
experiences with interest. Openness diverged from Intellect in
the experience of pleasure. Intellect did not predict individual
diﬀerences in the processes associated with pleasure, but
novelty was a stronger predictor of pleasure for people high
in Openness. Further, Openness predicted greater interest
and pleasure regardless of how artworks were appraised,
further distinguishing it from Intellect. Openness and Intellect
were related to lower levels of confusion, but variance in
appraisal-emotion relationships was not associated with either
aspect.
Finally, the possible confound of art expertise was evaluated as
an explanation for the Openness-aesthetic emotions relationship.
The inclusion of art expertise did not inﬂuence any of the
Openness-aesthetic emotion relationships, suggesting that the
eﬀects were particular to the personality variables rather than
greater expertise. Expertise did predict greater interest and less
confusion overall, and it was related to a smaller relationship
between novelty and confusion.
Together these ﬁndings provide an important update for our
understanding of the relationship between the Openness/Intellect
and aesthetic emotions. Particularly, our ﬁndings show that
Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect of the aesthetically
engaged, and provide a process based understanding for why
those higher in Openness are more aesthetically engaged. Finally,
methodological diﬀerences between this and previous research
on personality and aesthetics highlight the advantages of the
current approach.
Within this paper we assume rather that test a causal ﬂow from
personality to emotion states. That is, we assume that personality
reﬂects biologically driven consistencies in emotions, cognitions,
and behavior. Therefore, personality is treated as an antecedent
of states. Similarly, appraisals are considered to be antecedents
of emotions. For interest, both appraisals, when experimentally
manipulated, have been shown to inﬂuence interest (Silvia, 2005).
Thus, within this paper, we treat appraisals as causing emotions.
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Advantages of the Current Method
There are two methodological diﬀerences between the current
method and most of the research on personality and aesthetics.
First, we moved away from the predominant practice of
evaluating liking artworks and shifted toward measuring distinct
emotional states that have previously been implicated in the
aesthetic experience. Liking is a common and important
aesthetic response—mild feelings of pleasure might be the
most common everyday aesthetic experience—but it is only
one of many important experiences people have in response
to the arts (Silvia, 2009). Second, we explored both within-
and between-person eﬀects. The integration of dispositional
and situational variables has long been advocated (Cronbach,
1957; Underwood, 1975), but it is uncommon for aesthetics
research to examine eﬀects at the within-person level of
analysis, which is the natural level for examining how appraisals
inﬂuence emotional responses (see Silvia, 2007b; Nezlek,
2011).
The How and Why of Openness/Intellect
and Esthetics
Previous research has demonstrated that Openness/Intellect is
related to diﬀerences in appraisal processes for the emotion of
interest (Silvia, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The current research
builds on these ﬁndings in two important ways by: (a) evaluating
the independent roles of Openness and Intellect in interest-
appraisal processes; and (b) evaluating diﬀerences in pleasure-
appraisal and confusion-appraisal processes.
Openness and Intellect were both associated with reactivity
to novelty in the experience of interest suggesting that
novelty sensitivity is at the core of the domain. However,
Intellect, as opposed to Openness, did not reﬂect greater
interest overall. This suggests that being higher on Intellect
is reﬂective of lower than average levels of interest when
novelty is not found in an artwork, yet higher than average
interest for novel artworks. Conversely, Openness was
related to greater interest regardless of appraised novelty
suggesting that while novelty is preferred, greater interest
is experienced even in the absence of it. The sensitivity to
novelty in the experience of interest for both Openness and
Intellect provides a possible process explanation for part
of the Openness-Fluid-Crystallized-Intelligence (OFCI)
model which proposes a developmental link between
Openness/Intellect and ﬂuid intelligence (Ziegler et al., 2012).
Ziegler et al. (2012) propose that being open increases learning
opportunities, thereby increasing ﬂuid intelligence. Our
ﬁndings suggest that Openness/Intellect is associated with a
sensitivity, through interest, to stimuli and situations that are
appraised as novel and complex. This preferential engagement
with challenging information could support the pathway
from Openness/Intellect to gains in ﬂuid and crystallized
intelligence.
While the Openness and Intellect aspects reﬂect quantitative
diﬀerences in the appraisal structure of interest, qualitative
diﬀerences are present in the experience of pleasure. Openness,
but not Intellect, was associated with the presence or absence of
a pleasure-novelty relationship. Studies have shown quantitative
diﬀerences in appraisal structures—the appraisal structure
remains constant yet the predictive strength of an appraisal
varies as a function of a trait (Kuppens and Tong, 2010).
However, few studies have found qualitative diﬀerences in
appraisal structures. Our ﬁndings indicate that those higher
in Openness experience pleasure as a function of novelty
and understanding, while those lower on the aspect are only
inﬂuenced by understanding. The idea that understandable
things are pleasant is congruent with ﬂuency based aesthetic
theories where things that are easily understood are pleasant to
the beholder (Reber, 2012). Our ﬁndings suggest that this may
primarily be the case for people lower on Openness. For those
higher on Openness, pleasure is also inﬂuenced by the novelty of
an artwork.
This ﬁnding has important implications for aesthetic theories.
Fluency based accounts are at odds with interest based
accounts. Interest requires novelty, whereas ﬂuency-based
aesthetic experiences are a function of easy processing. This
distinction maps nicely onto interest and pleasure. Interest is
experienced in the face of novelty and pleasure is experienced
when processing requires little eﬀort. Our research suggests that
individual diﬀerences both complicate and clarify this distinction.
It seems that the inﬂuence of ﬂuent processing in the experience
of aesthetic pleasure is dependent on trait standing. Those
higher in Openness are sensitive to novelty and complexity in
their experience of pleasure. Conversely, pleasurable experiences
for those lower on Openness are not predicted by stimulus
novelty.
Openness/Intellect Model
These ﬁndings add to the growing empirical consensus for the
utility of studying Openness and Intellect as separate aspects
of the broader domain. The distinction previously proposed—
Openness as exploration through perception, and Intellect
through learning and abstract information (DeYoung, 2014)—
is supported with Openness reﬂecting greater pleasure and
interest and less confusion in response to visual art. While
Intellect was also found to play a role in the processes that
facilitate interest, this role does not predict greater aesthetic
reactions but rather reﬂects a preference for the novel, and
a lesser tendency to feel confusion in response to visual art.
The relationship between Intellect and interest in art, when
controlling for Openness, is not evident at the between-
person level, but is apparent when within-person processes
are considered. Future studies are encouraged to explore the
diﬀerential inﬂuence of Openness and Intellect on interest
in non-perceptual stimuli such as science and philosophy
to gain further insights into this useful separation of the
Openness/Intellect domain.
CONCLUSION
Henry James saw art as central to life and beauty, and this attitude,
like that of many other creative people, was likely a function
of his Openness. We aimed to extend our understanding of the
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role personality plays in common aesthetic experiences: pleasure,
interest, and confusion. Our ﬁndings suggest that Openness,
as opposed to Intellect, is the personality core of aesthetic
experiences, and that the relationship persists because those
higher in Openness are more sensitive to novelty in artworks
and experience greater engagement overall, predisposing them
to feel more interest and pleasure in response to the
arts.
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